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Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(b), California
Broadcasters Association (the “CBA”) respectfully requests leave to file a brief
in support of Defendants-Appellees’ position seeking rehearing en banc of the
Court’s Opinion dated February 26, 2014.
The CBA submits its brief to address the panel majority’s decision in
Garcia v. Google, 743 F.3d 1258 (9th Cir. 2014). By holding that PlaintiffAppellant Cindy Lee Garcia (“Garcia”) likely owns a separate copyright in her
brief performance within the film entitled “Innocence of Muslims” (the “Film”),
Garcia raises important concerns regarding the scope of copyright protection
for entertainment companies involved in the broadcast, exhibition, and
distribution of content, among others. As set forth in their brief, the CBA
respectfully submits that the panel majority’s decision conflicts with the
Copyright Act, well-established Ninth Circuit precedent, and the Copyright
Office’s longstanding practices (as the Copyright Office expressly recognized
in refusing to register Garcia’s claim in her individual performance in the Film).
The Court should Grant Google Inc. and YouTube, LLC’s Petition for
Rehearing En Banc to address the issues raised therein and discussed in the
CBA’s brief.
///
///
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The CBA has a compelling and unique interest in the issues raised by the
panel majority’s holding, which holding affects broadcasters’, exhibitors’, and
distributors’ respective abilities to distribute and exploit creative works. As a
trade association representing the interests of state television broadcasters, the
CBA suffers immediate effects from significant changes in the application of
United States copyright law. The panel majority’s opinion could significantly
and adversely affect the CBA’s businesses and the industry in which it operates.
Specifically, a finding that individual performances within films and television
programs may be entitled to copyright protection creates uncertainly for
entertainment media creators and distributors—an overwhelming number of
which reside within the Ninth Circuit. The resulting uncertainty and risk of
liability threatens to stifle the creativity that the Copyright Act serves to foster.
Consequently, the CBA has a considerable interest in the outcome of this
action.
The CBA is familiar with the issues presented in this case. In addition to
its familiarity with copyright litigation, the CBA has reviewed the Garcia
parties’ appellate briefs as well as the district court order on appeal.
///
///
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Based on the foregoing, the CBA respectfully requests leave to file its
brief, which is submitted with this motion.
DATED: April 11, 2014

Respectfully submitted,
KELLEY DRYE & WARREN LLP
Lee S. Brenner
Allison S. Brehm
Ken D. Kronstadt
By

s/ Allison S. Brehm
Allison S. Brehm
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae California
Broadcasters Association
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I.
INTRODUCTION AND INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
Amicus Curiae California Broadcasters Association (the “CBA”) submits
this brief to address issues raised by this Court’s Opinion dated February 26, 2014.
By holding that Plaintiff-Appellant Cindy Lee Garcia (“Garcia”) likely owns a
separate copyright in her brief performance within the film entitled “Innocence of
Muslims” (the “Film”), the panel majority created uncertainty for entertainment
companies involved in the broadcast, exhibition, and distribution of content created
by and licensed from others regarding whether individual performances within
entertainment works such as motion pictures and television programs may be
entitled to copyright protection separate and apart from that of the work as a whole.
The CBA respectfully submits that the panel majority’s decision conflicts
with the Copyright Act, well-established Ninth Circuit precedent, and the
Copyright Office’s longstanding practices (as the Copyright Office expressly
recognized in refusing to register Garcia’s claim in her individual performance in
the Film). The panel majority has opened the door for any performer to claim sole
ownership of a small piece within a larger work, attempt to enjoin distribution of
the larger work, and sue not only the filmmaker or creator but any downstream
distributor. Such a performer would then wield far more power over the
distribution and licensing of the entire work than even a co-author thereof. While
litigants seeking to rely on the majority opinion in cases involving less incendiary
LA01\KronK\510863.6

1

Case: 12-57302

04/11/2014

ID: 9055925

DktEntry: 82-2

Page: 6 of 20

facts may be unlikely to succeed, the trial-and-error period will be costly and time
consuming for content broadcasters, exhibitors, and distributors.
Emphatically, the CBA does not condone Mark Basseley Youssef’s
(“Youssef”) actions or the hardship his conduct visited on Garcia, nor does the
CBA fault the Court for its desire to remedy the wrong Garcia suffered. The
Opinion related to an actress who had been deceived and unwillingly included in
an abhorrent piece of hate speech, and the Court understandably felt compelled to
fashion a remedy. It is evident from the Opinion that the panel majority
appropriately endeavored to limit its holding to the deeply troubling facts before it.
Nevertheless, the panel majority’s holding is wrong as a matter of law, creates
uncertainty and unpredictability for content broadcasters, exhibitors, and
distributors, and exposes them to litigation from performers who were not
mistreated as Garcia was but still claim an individual copyright in their own
performances. There are remedies available to the Garcia, but they are – correctly
– against the wrongdoer (Youssef), not against third parties.
The CBA has a compelling and unique interest in the issues raised by the
panel majority’s holding, which holding affects broadcasters’, exhibitors’, and
distributors’ respective abilities to distribute and exploit creative works. As a
trade association representing the interests of state television broadcasters, the
CBA suffers immediate effects from significant changes in the application of
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United States copyright law. The panel majority’s opinion could significantly and
adversely affect the CBA’s businesses and the industry in which it operates.
Specifically, a finding that individual performances within films and television
programs may be entitled to copyright protection creates uncertainly for
entertainment media creators and distributors—an overwhelming number of which
reside within the Ninth Circuit. The resulting uncertainty and risk of liability
threatens to stifle the creativity that the Copyright Act serves to foster.
Consequently, the CBA has a considerable interest in the outcome of this action.
As detailed below, the CBA respectfully supports Google and Youtube’s
request for rehearing en banc on the grounds that Garcia’s individual performance
is not separately copyrightable. Absent clarification, the decision creates
confusion over the scope of copyright protection and threatens to dramatically
increase meritless copyright litigation initiated by performers, however miniscule
their contributions to the copyrighted work.
This brief was authored only by the CBA and its counsel. No party or its
counsel authored this brief in whole or in part or contributed money to fund this
brief.
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II.
AN INDIVIDUAL PERFORMANCE IN A FILM OR TELEVISION
PROGRAM IS NOT SEPARATELY PROTECTABLE BY COPYRIGHT
A.

An Individual Performance Within A Work is Not Independent Of That
Work
The panel majority’s holding that Garcia likely owns a separate copyright in

her brief performance in the Film is a departure from well-settled copyright law.
The panel majority acknowledged that a film is typically viewed as a joint work.
February 26, 2014 Opinion, Dkt. No. 39-1 (“Opn.”) at 6. A “joint work” is
“prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions will be
merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.” 17 U.S.C. §
101. Motion pictures and television programs, which synthesize the contributions
of “the writer . . . , the director, the photographer, the actors, and , arguably, other
contributors such as the set and costume designers,” are the quintessence of joint
works. 1 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 6.05
(1990). For these and similar works, “the collaborators’ contributions are woven
into a whole, and the individual contributions cannot be separated into different
works.” 2 William F. Patry, Patry on Copyright § 5:6. Indeed, the panel majority
implicitly recognized that, absent such a distinction, “any analysis of the rights that
might attach to the numerous creative contributions that make up a film can
quickly become entangled in an impenetrable thicket of copyright.” Opn. at 10-11.
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In denying Garcia’s claim that she has a copyrightable interest in the Film,
after the panel issued the Opinion, the Copyright Office stated in no uncertain
terms:
[A]n actor’s or actress’ performance in the making of a
motion picture is an integrated part of the resulting work,
the motion picture as a whole. . . . If her contribution was
neither a work made for hire nor the requisite authorship
to warrant a claim in a joint work, Ms. Garcia has no
separable claim to copyrightable authorship in her
performance.
March 6, 2014 letter at 2, attached hereto.
Normally, as a co-owner in the work as a whole, a joint author can utilize the
work “without the other’s permission and indeed over the other author’s
objection.” 2 Patry on Copyright § 5:7. Indeed, each co-owner has an
independent right to use of the copyright without the other co-owner’s consent.
Oddo v. Ries, 743 F.2d 630, 633 (9th Cir. 1984). The panel majority, however, held
that an actress whose only contribution to a motion picture was a 5-second
performance has 100% control of that island within the Film. The result: as the
sole “owner” of the 5-second performance, the performer has more power than a
joint author of a motion picture or television program to try to prevent the
distribution and licensing of the entire work.
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The Opinion Is Inconsistent With Well-Established Ninth Circuit
Authority Regarding “Authorship”
The panel majority sidestepped established Ninth Circuit precedent under

which an actress reciting lines written by another, under the direction of another, is
unlikely to be deemed an “author.” As this Court explained in Aalmuhammed v.
Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1232 (9th Cir. 1999), “authorship is not the same thing as
making a valuable and copyrightable contribution.” Id. at 1233. Indeed, “[a]
creative contribution does not suffice to establish authorship[.]” Id. Rather, as the
Supreme Court held long ago in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony
(“Burrow-Giles”), 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1883), the author is the person who
“‘superintend[s]’ the work by exercising control . . . or ‘the inventive or master
mind’ who ‘creates, or gives effect to the idea.’” Id. at 1234 (quoting BurrowGiles, 111 U.S. at 58 (1883)); see Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499
U.S. 340, 347 (1991).
Here, the panel majority questioned whether Youssef exercised creative
control over the manner in which the film was shot. Opn. at 12. More
fundamentally, as the Dissent observed, Garcia herself had no creative control over
the script or her performance and therefore she (putting aside Yousef) cannot be
considered an “inventive or master mind” of her performance. See Opn. at 25-26.
While the panel majority concluded that Garcia’s artistic contributions were
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sufficiently creative based on acting manuals, see Opn. at 8-9, this conclusion does
not comport with existing Ninth Circuit law.
In Aalmuhammed, this Court analogized the authorship of a movie to the
authorship of the photograph at issue in Burrow-Giles. In Burrow-Giles, the
Supreme Court deemed the photographer to be the author of a photograph even
though the lithographer and Oscar Wilde, the subject of the photograph, each made
substantial copyrightable creative contributions. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co.,
111 U.S. at 61. Following the Court’s analogy from Aalmuhammed, Garcia posed
but made no substantial copyrightable creative contributions and therefore should
not be deemed an author.
III.
ABSENT CLARIFICATION, THE MAJORITY OPINION CREATES
CONFUSION FOR COURTS AND COPYRIGHT LITIGANTS WITHIN
THE NINTH CIRCUIT
The majority opinion places a tremendous burden on content creators to
ensure that actors and actresses sign work-for-hire or other agreements based on its
assumption that “copyright interests in the vast majority of films are covered by
contract, the work for hire doctrine or implied licenses.” Opn. at 11. This
observation, while reasonable in theory, does not account for the real-life
circumstances that content providers face on a daily basis. Although studios and
production companies with legal departments and experienced personnel endeavor
to ensure that persons appearing on screen execute formal agreements, releases, or
LA01\KronK\510863.6

7

Case: 12-57302

04/11/2014

ID: 9055925

DktEntry: 82-2

Page: 12 of 20

assignments, human error and technical glitches are inevitable in a fast-paced
production environment. Such companies are frequently working under
tremendous pressure while racing toward rapidly approaching deadlines. And
emerging genres such as reality television, “mockumentaries,” and “docufiction” –
each of which is frequently filmed in public – can further hinder these companies’
ability to guarantee that not a single agreement slips through the cracks. As the
panel majority recognizes, “every schmuck with a videocamera” can potentially
become “a movie mogul.” Opn. at 12-13. Copyright is not limited to major
studios with robust in-house legal departments. Nor are copyright-infringement
suits.
In the wake of the panel majority’s holding, content providers within the
Ninth Circuit are left to wonder whether a performance within a motion picture or
television program is an integrated part of the work as a whole – as well-settled
authority and the Copyright Office direct – or whether the performance is
separately copyrightable. The panel majority offered no guidance as to the
prerequisites, if any, needed for a performer to claim a separate copyright in her
performance. If every person appearing in a film or television program can claim
an undifferentiated (but not joint) copyright interest in their small piece within a
larger work, and thereafter sue for alleged unlawful use of that small piece
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(however de minimis the use), litigation within the Ninth Circuit will undoubtedly
increase unless and until the court provides clarity.
The need for clarity is amplified when the interests of content broadcasters,
exhibitors, and distributors are considered. Such companies often have no way of
knowing whether every filmmaker or creator of every work in its system obtained
a license from every performer appearing in that work. Unless the Court clarifies
the panel majority’s opinion, such companies are at risk of being sued as infringers
by any performer claiming independent ownership of his or her individual
performance.
Permitting individual performances to be copyrightable puts content
broadcasters, exhibitors, and distributors to a Hobson’s choice: demand the right to
edit individual performances out of works over the vehement protests of creators of
the work as a whole, or demand to be provided every release, license, or work-forhire agreement before making the work available to the public. While
broadcasters, exhibitors, and distributors can demand indemnities from studios,
such an indemnity cannot prevent repeated litigation and attempted injunctions; it
can only reallocate, between entertainment companies, the hefty costs of prolonged
litigation on an ex post basis.
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IV.
THE COURT SHOULD GRANT GOOGLE AND YOUTUBE’S REQUEST
FOR A REHEARING EN BANC, AT A MINIMUM
For commendable reasons, the panel majority wedged a square peg into a
round hole. The CBA does not for a moment dispute that Garcia has been
mistreated by Youssef and should have her day in court. But Garcia’s recourse is
against Youssef for using Garcia’s likeness without her permission, not against
Google or other third-party distributors of the Film. Garcia cannot pursue such a
claim against Google because it has immunity under Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act for claims regarding Youssef’s conduct. 47 U.S.C.
§§ 230(c)(1), 230(f)(3); Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v.
Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008). This is as it should
be. Other than federal intellectual property law, courts do not hold providers of
online services liable for the torts of third parties. See id. Yet Garcia and the panel
majority, deciding correctly that Youssef’s actions require redress, have
improperly distorted copyright law to the point that it is unrecognizable to the
Copyright Office or when compared against Ninth Circuit precedent.
The proper course here is for the Court to follow Aalmuhammed, or hold that
there is no fixation of Garcia’s work in the first instance, 1 or both. Alternatively,

1

The Copyright Act requires that the fixation be “of more than transitory
duration,” and done “by or under the authority of the author.” 17 U.S.C. § 101
(definition of “fixed”). Garcia’s 5-second performance was of a transitory
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10

Case: 12-57302

04/11/2014

ID: 9055925

DktEntry: 82-2

Page: 15 of 20

if the Court believes that the District Court failed to address all of the relevant
factors in finding that Garcia was unlikely to succeed on the merits of her
copyright claim, it should remand the case for further proceedings and
clarification. Otherwise, the Court should grant Google and Youtube’s Petition for
Rehearing En Banc to address the issues raised in Google and Youtube’s Petition
and discussed herein.
V.
CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, the CBA respectfully submits that rehearing en
banc should be granted.
DATED: April 11, 2014

Respectfully submitted,
KELLEY DRYE & WARREN LLP
Lee S. Brenner
Allison S. Brehm
Ken D. Kronstadt
By

s/ Allison S. Brehm
Allison S. Brehm
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae California
Broadcasters Association

duration. It was not fixed on its own, but through the fixation of the Film as a
whole. If Garcia’s copyright in her performance is independent of the Film’s
copyright, and if Youssef’s use of her independent copyright was unauthorized,
then common sense dictates that she cannot claim that the fixation of the Film was
an authorized fixation of her performance. The Copyright Office recognized this
when it denied Garcia’s claim, stating “[Garcia’s] performance was one of many
actors’ performances that was . . . fixed by others in the creation of the motion
picture as a whole.” March 6, 2014 Letter at 3.
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